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TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way From Seattle to Doha
Ellen 't Hoen*

I. INTRODUCTION

Infectious diseases kill over 10 million people each year, more than 90 percent of
whom are in the developing world.' The leading causes of illness and death in Africa,
Asia, and South America-regions that account for four-fifths of the world's
population-are HIV/AIDS, respiratory infections, malaria, and tuberculosis.
In particular, the magnitude of the AIDS crisis has drawn attention to the fact
that millions of people in the developing world do not have access to the medicines
that are needed to treat disease or alleviate suffering. Each day, dose to eight thousand
people die of AIDS in the developing world.2 The reasons for the lack of access to
essential medicines are manifold, but in many cases the high prices of drugs are a
barrier to needed treatments. Prohibitive drug prices are often the result of strong
intellectual property protection. Governments in developing countries that attempt
to bring the price of medicines down have come under pressure from industrialized
countries and the multinational pharmaceutical industry.
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement ("TRIPS" or "Agreement"), which sets out
the minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property, including patents
for pharmaceuticals, has come under fierce criticism because of the effects that
increased levels of patent protection will have on drug prices. While TRIPS does

1.
2.

Ellen 'tHoen is Coordinator of the Globalisation Project of M~decins sans Fronti~res ("MSF)
Access to Essential Medicines Campaign. She holds a master's degree in law from the University of
Amsterdam. The author wishes to thank Ms. Que Mai Do for her assistance in preparing the
manuscript.
World Health Organization, The World Healtb Report 2001, 144 (WHO 2000).
See UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 125, 129, 133 (UNAIDS 2000), available
online at <http://wvww.unaids.org/epidemicjupdare/report/EpLreport.pdf> (visited Mar 24,
2002) (outlining the statistics utilized to reach the generally recognized figure of eight thousand
deaths per day due to AIDS in the developing world).
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offer safeguards to remedy negative effects of patent protection or patent abuse, in
practice it is unclear whether and how countries can make use of these safeguards
when patents increasingly present barriers to medicine access.
The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in 2001 in Doha, Qatar,
adopted a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health ("Doha Declaration" or
"Declaration") which affirmed the sovereign right of governments to take measures to
protect public health. Public health advocates welcomed the Doha Declaration as an
important achievement because it gave primacy to public health over private
intellectual property, and clarified WTO Members' rights to use TRIPS safeguards.
Although the Doha Declaration broke new ground in guaranteeing Members' access
to medical products, it did not solve all of the problems associated with intellectual
property protection and public health.
II. THE ACCESS PROBLEM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A number of new medicines that are vital for the survival of millions are already
too costly for the vast majority of people in poor countries. In addition, investment in
research and development ("R&D") towards the health needs of people in developing
countries has almost come to a standstill. Developing countries, where three-quarters
of the world population lives, account for less than 10 percent of the global
pharmaceutical market. The implementation of TRIPS is expected to have a further
upward effect on drug prices, while increased R&D investment, despite higher levels
of intellectual property protection, is not expected
One-third of the world population lacks access to the most basic essential drugs
and, in the poorest parts of Africa and Asia, this figure climbs to one-half. Access to
treatment for diseases in developing countries is problematic either because the
medicines are unaffordable, have become ineffective due to resistance, or are not
sufficiently adapted to specific local conditions and constraints.
Many factors contribute to the problem of limited access to essential medicines.
Unavailability can be caused by logistical supply and storage problems, substandard
drug quality, inappropriate selection of drugs, wasteful prescription and inappropriate
use, inadequate production, and prohibitive prices. Despite the enormous burden of
disease, drug discovery and development targeted at infectious and parasitic diseases in
poor countries has virtually ground to a standstill because drug companies in
developed and developing nations simply cannot recoup the cost of R&D for products

3.

See MSF Access to Essential Medicines Campaign and The Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working
Group, Fatal Imbalance; The Crisis in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases 10-18
(Sept 2001), available online at
<http://www.msf.org/source/access/2001/fatal/fatal.pdf> (visited Mar 24, 2002).

VA 3 WO. 1

T RyPS, Tbarnaceutica('Tatents,and,Access to .Fsentia(.A.edicines

"t1-foen

to treat diseases that abound in developing countries.4 Of the 1,223 new drugs
approved between 1975 and 1997, approximately 1 percent (13 drugs) specifically
treat tropical diseases.
TRIPS sets out minimum standards and requirements for the protection of
intellectual property rights, including trademarks, copyrights, and patents. The
implementation of TRIPS, initially scheduled for 2006 by all WTO Members, is
expected to impact the possibility of obtaining new essential medicines at affordable
prices.
M6decins sans Fronti~res ("MSF"), together with other non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs"), formulated the following concerns related to TRIPS:
* Increased patent protection leads to higher drug prices.6 The number of new
essential drugs under patent protection will increase, but the drugs will
remain out of reach to people in developing countries because of high prices.
As a result, the access gap between developed and developing countries will
widen.
* Enforcement of WTO rules will have a negative effect on local manufacturing
capacity and will remove a source of generic, innovative, quality drugs on
which developing countries depend.
" It is unlikely that TRIPS will encourage adequate R&D in developing
countries for diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis, because poor countries
often do not provide sufficient profit potential to motivate R&D investment
by the pharmaceutical industry.
* Developing countries are under pressure from industrialized countries and
the pharmaceutical industry to implement patent legislation that goes beyond
the obligations of TRIPS. This is often referred to as "TRIPS plus." TRIPS
plus is a non-technical term which refers to efforts to extend patent life
beyond the twenty-year TRIPS minimum, to tighten patent protection, to
or to limit
limit compulsory licensing in ways not required by TRIPS,
7
generics.
of
introduction
prompt
facilitate
exceptions which
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See Bernard P&oul, et al, Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries. A Lost Battle?, 281 JAMA 361
(1999).
See Patrice Trouiller and Piero Olliaro, Drug Development Outputfrom 1975 to 1996: What Proportion
for TropicalDiseases?, 3 IntlJ Infect Diseases 61 (1999).
See F. Michael Scherer and Jayashree Watal, Post Trips Options for Access to Patented Medicines in
Developing Countries 11 (WHO Jan 2001), available online at
<http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg4_-paperl.pdf> (visited Mar 24, 2002) (reporting on three
independent studies that found a mean price increase of well over 200 percent with the introduction
of product parents).
See World Health Organization, Globalization, TRIPS and Access to Pharnaceuticals4 (March 2001),
available online at
<hrtp://wvw.who.int/medicines/fibrary/edm-general/6pagers/PPM03 %20ENG.pdf>
(visited Mar 24,2002).

Spring 2002

Chicago Journafof InternationalLaw

Industrialized countries and World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") offer expert assistance to help countries become TRIPS-compliant. This
technical assistance, however, does not take into account the health needs of the
populations of developing countries. Both of these institutions are under strong
pressure to advance the interests of large companies that own patents and other
intellectual property rights.
III. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DEBATE ON ACCESS TO
DRUGS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

A number of factors have shaped the debate on TRIPS and access to medicines,
directly or indirectly impacting the content of the Doha Declaration.
A. BIG PHARMA VS. NELSON MANDELA: TRADE DISPUTE IN SOUTH
AFRICA

In February 1998, the South African Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
and forty (later thirty-nine, as a result of a merger) mostly multinational
pharmaceutical manufacturers brought suit against the government of South Africa,
alleging that the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, No.
90 of 1997 ("Amendment Act") violated TRIPS and the South African constitution.!
The Amendment Act introduces a legal framework to increase the availability of
affordable medicines in South Africa. Provisions included in the Amendment Act are
generic substitution of off-patent medicines, transparent pricing for all medicines, and
the parallel importation of patented medicines.9
At the start of the litigation, the drug companies could rely on the support of
their home governments. For its part, the US had put pressure on South Africa by
withholding trade benefits and threatening further trade sanctions, aiming to force the
South African government to repeal the Amendment Act. 0 In 1998, the European

8.
9.

10.

See Pharmnaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa,
Case No 4183/98 (filed Feb 18, 1998).
Parallel imports are cross-border trade in a patented product, without the permission of the
manufacturer or publisher. Parallel imports rake place when there are significant price differences for
the same good in different markers. For more information, see Health Care and Intellectual Property:
ParallelInports, available online at <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/pi/> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub L No 105-277,
112 Stat 2681 (1999):
[N]one of the funds appropriated under this heading may be available for assistance for
the central Government of the Republic of South Africa, until the Secretary of State
reports in wririn to the appropriate committees of the Congress on the steps being taken
by the United Stares Government to work with the Government of the Republic of
South Africa to negotiate the repeal, suspension, or termination of section 15(c) of South
Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997.
Simon Barber, US Withholds Benefits over Zutna's Bill, Bus Day 13 (S Africa) (ul 15, 1998).
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Commission joined the US in pressuring South Africa to repeal the legislation."
AIDS activists effectively highlighted these policies, profoundly embarrassing thenpresidential candidate Al Gore. Confronted at election campaign rallies about his
personal involvement in the dispute, demonstrators accused him of killing babies in
Africa." As a result of increasing public pressure, the US changed its policies at the
end of 1999. By the time the case finally reached the courtroom in May 2000, the
drug companies could no longer count on the support of their home governments.
Demonstrators in major cities asked the companies to drop the case; several
governments and parliaments around the world, including the European Parliament,
demanded that the companies withdraw from the case. The legal action turned into a
public relations disaster for the drug companies."
During the course of the trial it became clear that the most contentious section
of the Amendment Act was based on a draft legal text produced by the WIPO
Committee of Experts, 4 a fact that made it difficult for the drug companies to
maintain the position that the Amendment Act violated South Africa's obligations
under international law. Eventually, the strong international public outrage over the
companies' legal challenge of a developing country's medicines law and the companies'
weak legal position caused the companies to unconditionally drop the case in April
2001.
The widely publicized South African court case brought two key issues out into
the international arena. First, the interpretation of the flexibilities of TRIPS and
their use for public health purposes needed clarification to ensure that developing
countries could use its provisions without the threat of legal or political challenge.
Second, it became clear that industrialized countries that exercised trade pressures to
defend the interest of their multinational industries could no longer exert pressure
without repercussions at home.

11.

See Letter from Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-President of the European Commission, to Thabo Mbeki,

12.

Vice-President of South Africa (Mar 23, 1998) ("Section 15c of the [medicines] law in question
would appear to be at variance with South Africa's obligations under the TRIPS and its
implementation would negatively affect the interest of the European pharmaceutical industry.")
[Letter on file with CJIL].
See Simon Barber, Activists Accuse the US of Blocking Access to Drugs, Bus Day 6 (S Africa) (Apr 19,

1999).
13.

14.

See Helene Cooper, Rachel Zimmerman, and Laurie McGinley, Patents Pending AIDS Epidemnic
Traps Drug Firns In a Vise: Treatments vs. Profits, Wall St J Al (Mar 2, 2001) ("Can the
pharmaceuticals industry inflict any more damage upon its ailing public image? Well, how about
suing Nelson Mandela?").
See Pat Sidley, Silent Trump Card Gives State Winning Hand,Bus Day 2 (S Africa) (Apr 20, 2001).
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B. US vs. BRAZIL: THE BRAZILIAN AIDS PROGRAM
Since the mid-1990s, Brazil has offered comprehensive AIDS care, including
universal access to antiretroviral ("ARV") treatment. An estimated 536,000 people
are infected with HIV in Brazil, with 203,353 cases of AIDS reported to the Ministry
of Health from 1980 through December 2000. In 2001, 105,000 people with
HIV/AIDS received ARV treatment. The Brazilian AIDS program has reduced
AIDS-related mortality by more than 50 percent between 1996 and 1999.15 In two
years, Brazil saved $472 million in hospital costs and treatment costs for AIDSrelated infections.
At the core of the success of Brazil's AIDS program is the ability to produce
medicines locally. In Brazil, the price of AIDS drugs fell by 82 percent over five years
16
as a result of generic competition. The price of drugs that had no generic competitor
remained relatively stable, falling only 9 percent over the same period. Brazil has also
been able to negotiate lower prices for patented drugs by using the threat of
production under a compulsory license. 7 Article 68 of the Brazilian patent law allows
for compulsory licensing, which allows a patent to be used without the consent of the
patent holder. 8 The Brazil AIDS program serves as a model for some developing
countries that are able to produce medicines locally, and Brazil has offered a
cooperation agreement, including technology transfer, to developing countries for the
production of generic ARV drugs.'9
In February 2001, the US took action against Brazil at the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") over Article 68 of the Brazilian intellectual property law.
Under that provision, Brazil requires holders of Brazilian patents to manufacture the
product in question within Brazil-a so-called "local working" requirement. If the
company does not fulfill this requirement, the patent shall be subject to compulsory
licensing after three years, unless the patent holder can show that it is not
economically feasible to produce in Brazil or can otherwise show that the requirement
to produce locally is not reasonable. If the company is allowed to work its patent by

15.
16.

17.

18.
19.

See Tina Rosenberg. Look at Brazil, NY Times § 6 at 26, 28 (Jan 28, 2001) ("The treatment program
has cut the AIDS death rate nationally by about 50 percent so far.").
See Ellen 't Hoen and Suerie Moon, Pills and Pocketbooks: Equity Pricing of Essential Medicines in
Developing Countries (MSF Jul 11, 2001), available online at <http://www.accessmedmsf.org/prod/publications.aspscntid=318200146197&contenttype=PARA>
(visited Mar 24,
2002).
See Brazil Ministry of Health, Official Note, Ministry of Health Announces Compulsory Licensing of
Nelfinavir Patent (Aug 22, 2001) [on file with author]; Jennifer L. Rich, Rocbe Reacbes Accord on Drug
with Brazil, NY Times C1 (Sept 1, 2001).
Law No 9,279 of May 14, 1996.
See Brazil Ministry of Health, National AIDS Drug Policy (May 2001), available online at
<http://www.aids.gov.br/assistencia/aids-drugs-policy.htm> (visited Mar 24, 2002) (discussing
the Horizontal Technical Co-operation Program in Latin America).
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importation instead of manufacturing in Brazil, parallel import by others will be
permitted.
The US argued that the Brazilian law discriminated against US owners of
Brazilian patents and that it curtailed patent holders' rights. The US claimed that the
Brazilian law violated Article 27.1 and Article 28.1 of TRIPS. 20 Brazil argued that
Article 68 was in line with the text and the spirit of TRIPS, including Article 5.4 of
the Paris Convention, which allows for compulsory licensing if there is a failure to
work a patent. Article 2.1 of TRIPS incorporates relevant articles of the Paris
Convention.
The US action came under fierce pressure from the international NGO
community, which feared it would have a detrimental effect on Brazil's successful
AIDS program.2 ' Brazil has been vocal internationally in the debates on access to
medicines, and on several occasions, including the G-8, the Roundtable of the
European Commission, and WHO meetings, Brazil has offered support to
developing countries to help them increase manufacturing capacity by transferring
technology and know-how. NGOs feared that the US action could have a negative
effect on other countries' ability to accept Brazil's offer of assistance. On June 25,
2001, in a joint statement with Brazil, the US announced that it would withdraw the
WTO panel against Brazil.2
C. THE ROLE OF NGOs
NGOs have played a key role in drawing attention to provisions of TRIPS that
can be used to increase access to medicines. One such provision pertains to
compulsory licensing, which enables a competent government authority to license the
use of an invention to a third-party or government agency without the consent of the
patent holder. The patent holder, however, according to Article 31 of TRIPS, retains
intellectual property rights and "shall be paid adequate remuneration" according to the
circumstances of the case. The first international meeting specifically on the use of
compulsory licensing to increase access to AIDS medicines took place in March 1999
at the Palais de Nations in Geneva and was organized by Consumer Project on
Technology, Health Action International, and MSF. Later that year, the same group
of NGOs organized the Amsterdam Conference on Increasing Access to Essential

20.

See World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States,
Brazil Measures Affecting PatentProtection,WTO Doc No WT/DS199/3 (Jan 9, 2001).

21.

22.

See, for example, MSF, US Action at WTO Threatens Brazil's Successful AIDS Programme,Press Release
(Feb 1, 2001), available online at
<http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/Publications.aspscntid=2182001228232&contenttype=PA
RA> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
See Helene Cooper, U.S. Drops WTO Complaint Against BrazilianPatent Law, Wall St J Eur A2 (June
26, 2001).
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Drugs in a Globalized Economy, which brought together 350 participants from 50
countries on the eve of the Seattle WTO ministerial conference. The statement
drawn up at this conference ("Amsterdam Statement") focused on establishing a
working group in the WTO on TRIPS and access to medicines, considering the
impact of trade policies on people in developing and least-developed countries, and
providing a public health framework for the interpretation of key features of WTO
agreements. The working group was to address questions related to the use of
compulsory licensing to increase access to medicines, mechanisms to allow production
of medicines for export markets to a country with no or insufficient production
capacity, patent barriers to research, and overly restrictive and anti-competitive
interpretations of TRIPS rules regarding protections of health registration data. In
addition, the working group was to examine "burden sharing' approaches for R&D
that permit countries to consider a wider range of policy instruments to promote
R&D and to consider the practical burdens on poor countries of administrating
patent systems. The Amsterdam Statement also urged national governments to
develop new and innovative mechanisms to ensure funding for R&D for neglected
diseases.
The Amsterdam Statement has served as a guide for the work of NGOs and
other advocates on TRIPS and public health. Many international and national
NGOs, such as the OXFAM campaign, "Cut the Cost," the South African
Treatment Action Campaign, and Act Up, are now involved in campaigning for
access to medicines.
D. THE WTO MINISTERIAL 1999 IN SEATTLE
Though public health and access to medicines did not form part of the official
agenda in Seattle in the way it would two years later in Doha, the issue did receive
attention for a number of reasons. First, in Seattle a Common Working Paper
section on TRIPS contained the following proposal: "to issue... compulsory licenses
for drugs appearing on the list of essential drugs of the World Health Organization."23
Since only about 11 of the 306 products on the WHO Model List of Essential Drugs
are patented drugs in certain countries,24 this proposal could have limited the use of
compulsory licensing, rather than making sure it became a useful tool to overcome
access barriers, such as prohibitive pricing, caused by patent abuse.
Then-US President Clinton chose Seattle as the venue to declare a change in US
policy with regard to intellectual property rights and access to medicines. The US
government had come under fierce attack from AIDS activists because of its policies
23.

24.

Common Working Paper of the EC, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, and Turkey to the
Seattle Ministerial Declaration 3 (Nov 29, 1999), available online at
<http://europa.eu.inr/comm/trade/2000-round/friends.pdf> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
High cost or price of a drug in general excludes a drug from the WHO Essential Drug List.

V01

3

No. 1

T",'PS, T1armaceutica('Iatents,and,Access to essentia../edcines

"t1-foen

in South Africa. Under the new policy, the US Trade Representative and the
Department of Health and Human Services would together establish a process to
analyze health issues that arise in the application of US trade-related intellectual
property law and policy. In his speech, President Clinton referred specifically to the
situation in South Africa and the HIV/AIDS crisis, saying that "the United States
will henceforward implement its health care and trade policies in a manner that
ensures that people in the poorest countries won't have to go without medicine they so
desperately need."'
In May 2000, President Clinton confirmed the change in US policy by issuing an
Executive Order on Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmaceuticals and Medical
Technologies, supporting the use of compulsory licenses to increase access to
HIV/AIDS medication in sub-Saharan Africa.& Although this policy change
contributed to breaking the taboo on the use of compulsory licensing in the health
field, attention to TRIPS and medicines at the WTO was diverted by the collapse of
the WTO conference in Seattle.2 However, outside the WTO, the debate on access
to medicines, TRIPS, and compulsory licensing became more intense.
E. CHANGING ATTITUDES AMONG GLOBAL PLAYERS
A number of international institutions and UN agencies contributed to the
debate on access to medicines and looked into the consequences of stronger
intellectual property protection for developing countries as a result of TRIPS.
1. The World Health Organization
The public health community first raised concerns about the consequences of
globalization and international trade agreements with respect to drug access during
the 1996 World Health Assembly. A resolution on the Revised Drug Strategy
("RDS") set out the WHO's medicines policy.2 The WHO resolution on the RDS
requested the WHO in paragraph 2(10) "to report on the impact of the work of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) with respect to national drug policies and
essential drugs and make recommendations for collaboration between WTO and
25.
26.
27.

28.

William J. Clinton, Remarks at a World Trade Organization Luncheon in Seattle, 35 Weekly Comp Pres
Doc 2494,2497 (Dec 1, 1999).
Exec Order No 13,155,65 Fed Reg 30,521 (2000).
See Kevin Gopal, With Chaos, A Reprieve. The Collapse of the WTO Talks in Seattle Has, for the Time
Being Diverted Attention from the Issue of Compulsory Licensing, Pharmaceutical Executive 32 (Jan 2000)
("Unlikely as it seems the pharmaceutical industry may have reason to thank the demonstrators who
brought Seattle and the ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to a
standstill. Had the demonstrators not disrupted the gathering, the forecast for global pharma might
be much cloudier.").
See World Health Organization, Revised Drug Strategy Resolution, World Health Assembly
Resolution WHA 49.14 (1996).
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WHO, as appropriate." This resolution gave the WHO the mandate to publish, in
1998, the first guide with recommendations to Member States for implementing
TRIPS while limiting the negative effects of higher levels of patent protection on drug
availability.2 The US and a number of European countries unsuccessfully pressured
the WHO in an attempt to prevent publication of the guide.'
At that time, the WHO's involvement in trade issues was highly controversial.
The emphasis on public health needs versus trade interest was seen as a threat to the
commercial sector of the industrialized world. For example, in 1998, in response to
the draft World Health Assemblys resolution on the RDS and in reference to
"considerable concern among the pharmaceutical industry," the European Directorate
General for Trade ("DG Trade") of the European Commission concluded: "No
priority should be given to health over intellectual property considerations."3'
However, subsequent resolutions of the World Health Assembly have
strengthened the WHO's mandate in the trade arena. In 2001, the World Health
Assembly adopted two resolutions in particular that had a bearing on the debate over
TRIPS." The resolutions addressed 1) the need to strengthen policies to increase the
availability of generic drugs, and 2) the need to evaluate the impact of TRIPS on
access to drugs, local manufacturing capacity, and the development of new drugs. As
a result, the WHO's work program on pharmaceuticals and trade now includes the
provision of policy guidance and information on intellectual property and health to
countries for monitoring and analyzing the effects of TRIPS on access to medicines.33
2. The UN Sub-Commission for the Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights
The UN Sub-Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
passed a resolution, pointing out the negative consequences for human rights to food,
health, and self-determination if TRIPS is implemented in its current form. The
resolution was an initial effort to monitor the implications of TRIPS on human rights
concerns. Reminding governments of the primacy of human rights obligations over

29.
30.
31.

32.

33.

See Germin Velasquez and Pascale Boulet, Globalization and Access to Drugs: Perspectives on the
WTO/TRIPS Agreement (WHO 2d ed 1999).
See Paul Benkimoun, Agressions et Menaces contre un Responsable de I'OMS Difenseur de l'Acc~s du Tiersmonde aux Medicaments, Le Monde (Aug 23, 2001).
European Commission (DG1), Note on the WHO's Revised Drug Strategy, Doc No 1/D/3/BW D
(98) (Oct 5, 1998), available online at <http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/who/eurds98.html>
(visited Mar 24, 2002).
See World Health Organization, Scaling up the Response to HIV/AIDS, World Health Assembly
Resolution WHA 54.10 (2001); World Health Organization, WHO Medicines Strategy, World
Health Assembly Resolution WHA 54.11 (2001).
See World Health Organization, Technical Cooperation Activities: Information from Other
Intergovernmental Organizations,WHO Doc No IP/C/W/305/Add.3 (Sept 25, 2001).
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economic policies and programs, the resolution states that there are "apparent
conflicts between the intellectual property rights regime embodied in TRIPS, on the
one hand, and international human rights law, on the other."' Referring specifically
to pharmaceutical patents, the resolution stresses the need for intellectual property
rights to serve social welfare needs.
3. The United Nations Development Program
In 1999, the United Nations Development Program's ("UNDP's") Human
Development Report made a plea for re-writing the rules of globalization to make
them work "for people-not just profits."' The report, in particular, draws attention
to the high cost of the patent system for developing countries compared to the
unequal distribution of the system's benefits. 97 percent of the patents held
worldwide are held by individuals and companies of industrialized countries, and 80
percent of the patents granted in developing countries belong to residents of industrial
countries. UNDP called for a full and broad review of TRIPS and called upon
countries not to create an unsustainable burden by adding new conditions to the
intellectual property system. The report suggested that countries present frameworks
for alternatives to the provisions of TRIPS and that the room for manoeuvring
granted in TRIPS be respected in practice.
4. The European Union
In February 2001, the EU adopted the Program for Action, a program which
accelerates action on HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in the context of poverty
reduction. The EU program recognized the potential problems of TRIPS and the
need to rebalance its priorities. In addition, several European Parliament resolutions
reflected a shift in support of a pro-public health approach to TRIPS." As part of
this approach, DG Trade changed its policy to acknowledge the concerns of
developing countries. Reflecting this change, DG Trade dropped its objections to the
use of compulsory licensing to overcome patent barriers to medicine access and
became an advocate for a global tiered pricing system for pharmaceuticals.37 These

34.

United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Resolution 2000/7, para 2, UN Doc No

E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/7 (2000).
35.
36.

United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1999,2 (Oxford 1999).
See, for example, European Parliament Resolution on Access to Drugs for HIV/AIDS Victims in
the Third World, 2001 oJ (C 343) 300.

37.

See World AIDS Day: Lamy Callsfor More Action on Access to Medicines After Progress in Doba, Press
Release of Pascal Lam/s speech marking World AIDS Day, European Union Trade Commissioner
(Nov 30, 2001), available online at
<hrtp://europa.eu.inr/comm/trade/speeches.artides/spla87_en.hrm> (visited Mar 24,2002).
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policy changes are in stark contrast to previous European Commission policies, which
closely track the pharmaceutical industry's agenda.
5. Other Organizations
Other organizations, such as UNAIDS, the World Bank, the Group of 77, and
regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity, added their voice to
the debate on TRIPS and access to medicines.
Unable to turn a deaf ear to the growing chorus of critics of TRIPS and its
effects on access to medicines, the WTO changed course. In April 2001, when
proposing a special TRIPS Council session on access to medicines, Zimbabwe-chair
of TRIPS Council-said that the WTO could no longer ignore the access to
medicines issue, an issue that was being actively debated outside the WTO but not
within it." The voices had been heard; public health would be featured as a key
subject at the Doha Conference.
IV. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS
AND PUBLIC HEALTH

The Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO took place in Doha in 2001
and was a breakthrough in international discussions on TRIPS and access to
medicines. The WTO Ministerial adopted a Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health, which put public health before commercial interests and offered much needed
clarification in the field of TRIPS and public health.
A. THE AFRICAN PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL TRIPS COUNCIL
MEETING IN JUNE

Zimbabwe's statement on behalf of the "African Group" about the need to
confront the access to medicines issue initiated preparations for the Declaration. Just
two months later, in June 2001, the TRIPS Council held its first session devoted to
TRIPS and access to medicines. It was the first time that the TRIPS Council
discussed intellectual property issues in the context of public health. At that meeting,
the African Group proposed issuing separate declarations on access to medicines.
Referring to the devastating AIDS crisis in Africa and mounting public concern,
Zimbabwe stated: "We propose that Members issue a special declaration on the
38.
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See Statement by Zimbabwe to the WTO TRIPS Council (Apr 5, 2001) ("Our intention is to
bring into this Council an issue that has aroused public interest and is being actively debated outside
this organisation, but one which we cannot afford to ignore.") [on file with CJIL].
Compare TRIPS and Public Health, WTO Doc No IP/C/W/296 (June 29, 2001) (working paper
submitted by the African group, joined by seventeen developing countries) with The Relationship
Between the Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and Access to Medicines, WTO Doc No IP/C/W/280
(une 12, 2001) (working paper submitted by the European Communities).
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TRIPS Agreement and access to medicines at the Ministerial Conference in Qatar,
affirming that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement should prevent Members from
taking measures to protect public health.:'
In September 2001, the TRIPS Council devoted another flil day of discussion
to the topic of access to medicines. At this meeting, the African Group, joined by
nineteen other countries, presented a draft text for a ministerial declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health. A comprehensive text, this proposal addressed political principles
to ensure that TRIPS did not undermine the legitimate right of WTO Members to
formulate their own public health policies. The text also provided practical
clarifications for provisions related to compulsory licensing, parallel import, data
protection, and production for export to a country with insufficient production
capacity. In addition, the draft included a proposal for evaluating the effects of TRIPS
on public health, with particular emphasis on access to medicines and R&D for the
prevention and treatment of diseases predominantly affecting people in developing
and least-developed countries.
At the meeting, the US, Japan, Switzerland, Australia, and Canada circulated an
alternate draft, stressing the importance of intellectual property protection for R&D,
arguing that intellectual property contributes to public health objectives globally. The
text was aimed at limiting the flexibilities of TRIPS during crisis and emergency
situations. The EU circulated its own draft, which proposed a solution to the
problem of production for exports to fulfill a compulsory license in a country with
insufficient or no production capacity by allowing production under the TRIPS
Article 30 exception.
From the onset of the pre-Doha negotiations, the main point of contention was
the text proposed by the developing countries: "Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement
shall prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health. ' Some
developed countries saw this wording as a new rule that would override the present
rules of 42TRIPS, which do not allow for health exceptions that are inconsistent with
TRIPS.

The text drafted by the chair of the WTO General Council, Mr. Stuart
Harbinson, that was the basis for the negotiations in Doha left the issue unresolved
and instead offered two options for Paragraph 4. The first option read:
Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement shall prevent Members from taking measures to
protect public health. Accordingly, w-hile reiterating our commitment to the
40.
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See WTO Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Special Discussion on
Intellectual Propertyand Access to Medicines 4, WTO Doc No IP/C/M/3i (Restricted) (July 10, 2001)
[on file with CJIL].
TRIPS and PublicHealth at summary (cited in note 39).
See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art 8(1), Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33 ILM 81 (1994) ('TRIPS
Agreement").
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TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement shall be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public
health and, in particular, to ensure access to medicines for all. In this connection,
we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the
TRIPS Agreement which provide flexibility for this purpose.
Whereas the second option offered was:
We affirm a Member's ability to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement which provide flexibility to address public health crises such as
HIV/AIDS and other pandemics, and to that end, that a Member is able to take
measures necessary to address these public health crises, in particular to secure
affordable access to medicines. Further, we agree that this Declaration does not add
to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members provided in the TRIPS
Agreement. With a view to facilitating the use of this flexibility by providing
greater certainty, we agree on the following clarifications.
In Doha, for three days the discussions on TRIPS and public health dominated
the trade talks. Early on in the meeting it became clear that a majority of Members
preferred the first option of the Harbinson draft, making it the basis for further
negotiation. The core supporters of the second option included the US, Japan,
Australia, Switzerland, Canada, and Korea. The EU, at this stage, did not take a clear
position and claimed it was playing the role of "honest broker." After three days of
negotiation among the participating Members, a compromise was reached. The
compromise text, which resulted from negotiations primarily between Brazil and the
US, read:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitments to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that te Agreement can and
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members'
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
This text acknowledges the unmitigated right of countries to take measures to
protect public health. Thus, if intellectual property rules should stand in the way of
doing so (for example, in the case of high prices associated with patented medicines),
countries are allowed to override the patent.
In Paragraph 5, the Declaration lays out the key measures and flexibiities within
TRIPS that can be used to overcome intellectual property barriers to access to
medicines. The discussions at Doha and the Doha Declaration itself make it
unambiguously clear that the use of compulsory licenses is in no way confined to cases
of emergency or urgency; in fact, the grounds for issuing a compulsory license are
unlimited. Members who proposed language that would have limited measures like
compulsory licensing to emergency situations, pandemics, or specified diseases such as
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World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, para 4, WTO Doc No VT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001) ("Doha Declaration" or
"Decldrationf).
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HIV/AIDS were unsuccessful. In addition, the Declaration leaves Members free to
determine for themselves what constitutes a national emergency or urgency, in which
cases the procedure for issuing a compulsory license becomes easier and faster. The
Declaration also resolves the question of whether TRIPS authorizes parallel trade
once and for all by noting- "The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that
are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member
free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge. '
In addition, the Declaration grants least-developed country ("LDCs") Members
an extra ten-year extension-until 2016, instead of 2006-to the implementation
deadline for pharmaceutical product patent protection. The negotiating history
illustrates that this outcome was not predetermined. Pre-Doha, the US proposed two
operative paragraphs, which included this extension of transition periods until 2016
for patents on pharmaceutical products, as well as offering a moratorium on dispute
settlement action to sub-Saharan African countries, which do not fall within the LDC
grouping. The moratorium covered laws, regulations and other measures that
improve access to patented medicines for HIV/AIDS and other pandemics. These
proposals were viewed as a "divide and conquer" strategy employed by the US to break
conre•45
the cohesion of the developing countries and the proposal for a moratorium on
dispute settlement actions was rejected at Doha. The proposals to extend the
deadlines for LDCs were accepted. The extended deadlines are important because
they extend the timeframe (until 2016) in which countries may rethink the kind of
pharmaceutical intellectual property law they want while still being able to import and
produce generic medicines.
The Declaration also refers to the as-yet unfulfilled commitment of developedcountry Members to provide incentives to their enterprises and institutions to
promote technology transfer to LDCs pursuant to Article 66.2. The ten-year
extension might be of limited value because only LDCs will be able to benefit from
this provision. Of the 143 WTO members, only 30 are LDCs, representing 10
percent of the world's population. The ten-year extension is also limited to Sections 5
(patents) and 7 (undisclosed information) of TRIPS; the extension does not apply to
other provisions of the Agreement relevant to pharmaceuticals, notably Article 70
("exclusive marketing rights"). Though there seemed to be an understanding among
the negotiators in Doha that Paragraph 7 implied that LDCs are not required to
provide "mail box" protection or "exclusive marketing rights," this is not clear from the
text of the declaration. Paragraph 7 of the declaration refers to pharmaceutical
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Id at para 5(d).
See Third World Network Info Service on WTO Issues, Update on Ministerial Declarationon TRIPS
and Public Health, available online at <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/info3.htm> (visited Mar 24,
2002) (discussing this and other points of contention between the developed and developing WTO
states).
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products, which means that LDCs still are under the obligation to provide process
patents.
C. OTHER AREAS OF DEBATE

1. Public Health: Most of the language aimed at narrowing the scope of the
Declaration to health crises and pandemics' was replaced with language that referred
generally to public health. Indeed, the title itself-Doha Declaration on Public
Health- reflects this shift.
2. Access for All: Some countries objected to the text that countries have the right
"to ensure access to medicines for all." 47 In particular, Switzerland objected to the
wording but had difficulty defending a position that advocated access to medicines
for some but not for others.
3. Scope: A point of strong contention was how far-reaching the Declaration
would be. Some WTO Members feared that the negotiations could lead to changes
in TRIPS and wanted to include a confirmation that the Declaration was purely a
clarifying exercise. They borrowed language from the WTO Dispute Settlement
Process Rules to indicate that the Ministerial Declaration would have no formal legal
effect to change the rights and obligations TRIPS established.
The text did not, however, make it into the final version of the Declaration. As a
result, one could argue that the Declaration actually does go beyond clarifying the
already existing rules. A Member can appeal to the Declaration and its negotiating
history in the event that a Member's legislation, particularly relating to patents in the
health field, is challenged on the grounds that it is incompatible with TRIPS.
D. WHY DOHA CAME TO PASS
Why was it possible to achieve a declaration on such a contentious issue
considering that public health hardly played a part in the trade talks two years ago?
Mike Moore, WTO Director-General, made it clear on the opening day of the
conference that the TRIPS and health issue could be the deal-breaker for a new trade
round. Observers point to a number of factors that contributed to the success of the
negotiations. 48 First, the developing country Members were extremely well prepared
and operated as one bloc. Second, the uncompromising positions of western
countries such as the US and Canada were hard to maintain in light of the anthrax
crisis and the threat that a shortage of Ciprofloxacine ("Cipro") might occur. Both the
US and Canada rapidly expressed their willingness to set aside the patent held by the
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Pandemics refer to diseases, mostly of infectious nature, that travel across borders.
Doha Declaration at para 4 (cited in note 43) (emphasis added).
See David Banta, Public Health Triumphs at WTO Conference, 286 JAMA 2655, 2655-65 (2001).
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German company Bayer if other solutions could not be found.49 The anthrax scare
and the threatened shortage of Cipro forced all WTO Members to ask how much of a
prisoner they want to be of their own patent systems. Third, a growing and active
international NGO movement ensured the issue would be high profile, and that
NGOs would monitor different countries' positions.
V. DRUG INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO THE WTO DECLARATION ON
TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH

The multinational pharmaceutical industry argued from the beginning that a
declaration was not necessary because: a) patents are not a problem,"0 and b)
weakening patent protection would have devastating effects on the R&D capabilities
Although the International Federation of
of the research-based industry.
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers ("IFPMA") officially welcomed the Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health, individuals in the industry expressed their concerns.
Indeed, the US pharmaceutical companies asked the USTR to re-open the
negotiations even after an agreement on the text of the Declaration was reached.
For more than two years, IFPMA has warned against the dangers of compulsory
licensing-ever since NGOs started to propose compulsory licensing systems to
overcome patent barriers. IFPMA's position has not changed. "[C]ompulsory
licensing is a threat to good public health by denying patients around the world the
future benefits of R&D capabilities of the research-based industry from which new
therapies come. " '
The generic drug industry welcomed the Declaration, in particular the freedom
of countries to decide the grounds for compulsory licensing. The generic drug
industry did express concern about possible unilateral pressure to influence countries
not to make full use of the Declaration. The industry suggested that the advanced
WTO Members should commit to the Declaration in practice by refraining from
exerting unilateral pressure. The generic drug contingent expressed disappointment
that there was no resolution of the issue that arises when a country with limited
production capacity that issues a compulsory license for a medicine cannot find an
efficient, affordable, and reliable source of medicines, due to TRIPS restrictions on
production and export of medicines. After 2005, production of affordable medicine
will increasingly become dependent on compulsory licensing. However, production
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See Amy Harmon and Robert Pear, A Nation Challenged: The Treatment; CanadaOverrides Patentfor
Cipro to Threat Anthrax, NY Times Al (Oct 19, 2001).
At Doha, the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers ("IFPMA") distributed
Amir Attaran and Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patentsfor AntiretroviralDrugs Constrain Access to AIDS
Treatment in Africa?, 286JAMA 1886 (2001).
IFPMA, Access to Medicines: The Right Policy Prescription(distributed at the WTO 2001) [on file with
CJIL].
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under a compulsory license is restricted to production "predominantly for the supply
of the domestic market." 2 The problem is not the compulsory license itself, but the
need to allow exports from a country where the drug is under patent to a country that
has issued the compulsory license.
The generic drug industry expressed further disappointment that the
Declaration did not offer an interpretation of the data protection issue addressed in
Article 39.3 of TRIPS. 3 The concern here is that an overly restrictive interpretation
of Article 39.3 will lead to delays in introduction of generic medicines, may provide
exclusive marketing rights beyond the patent protection term and increase barriers to
the registration of generic medicines including those produced under a compulsory
license.
V. THE POST-DOHA AGENDA

A key issue that remained unresolved in Doha is how to ensure that production
for export to a country that has issued a compulsory license, but does not have
manufacturing capacity, can take place within a country that provides pharmaceutical
patents. Since Article 31(f of TRIPS limits compulsory licensing to uses which are
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market, further clarification is necessary
to ensure that countries without production capacity can make use of compulsory
licensing provisions to the same extent that countries with manufacturing capacity can
use these provisions. The Doha Declaration acknowledges the problem in Paragraph
6:
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use
oT compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for
TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General
Council before the end of 2002.

It is increasingly urgent that the production for export issue be resolved.
Implementation deadlines for some important producing countries are quickly
approaching, thus further limiting the possibilities of producing generic versions of
medicines that are protected by patent elsewhere.
Another flaw of the Doha Declaration is that it does not resolve the problem of
production for export from markets that provide patents to countries that do not
grant pharmaceutical patents (and subsequently do not grant compulsory licenses).
This is of particular importance now that the least-developed WTO Members can
delay the granting of pharmaceutical product patents until 2016. These countries
need to have access to sources of affordable medicines, which threaten to dry up as the
2005 deadline for TRIPS implementation is nearing for producing countries.
52.
53.

TRIPS Agreement at art 31() (cited in note 42).
See Jayanta Ghosh, No Gainsfrom Doba, Say PbarmaFirms,Times (India) (Nov 27,2001).
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Another challenge will be to find ways to make the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health operational at the regional and national levels. A classic example is
the Bangui Agreement, the regional intellectual property agreement for francophone
Africa, which was adopted in 1977 and revised in 1999 to ensure TRIPS
compatibility, but includes typical TRIPS plus provisions that are not in line with the
Doha Declaration.
At the national level, countries should be encouraged to make full use of the
Doha Declaration in the process of adjusting national intellectual property laws to
become compliant with TRIPS. This will require substantial advice and technical
assistance from institutions like WIPO and WTO. While the spirit of the Doha
Declaration is to go slowly and to tailor intellectual property laws to national needs,
the practice has been to encourage developing countries to go beyond the minimum
requirements and speed up the process to become TRIPS-compliant. It will require
a "culture change' at WIPO and WTO to adjust the type of technical assistance to
developing countries' needs. In addition to increasing their interaction with countries,
WIPO and WTO will have to increase their level of collaboration with the public
health community, including the WHO, which has become heavily involved in trade
discussions as a result of the process that led to the Doha Declaration.
VI. CONCLUSION

The very fact that public health and access to medicines have been singled out as
major issues needing special attention in TRIPS implementation indicates that health
care and health care products need to be treated differently from other products. By
giving countries broad discretion in deciding how to counter the negative effects of
TRIPS, the Doha Declaration may stand for the proposition that public health
concerns outweigh fll protection of intellectual property.
In fact, the Doha Declaration takes a large step toward ensuring that intellectual
property protection actually serves the public interest, an interest broader than that of
the commercial sector. In the years to come, it will be important to scrutinize closely
whether the results of intellectual property protection serve the poor as well as the
rich. The Doha Declaration lays out the options countries have available when prices
of existing patented drugs are too high for their populations. But Doha did not solve
every problem: the lack of R&D investment in new drugs for the particular health
needs of the poor remains to be addressed.'

54.

See World Trade Organization, Doha General Ministerial Declaration, para 17, WTO Doc No
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov 14, 2001) ("We stress the importance we attach to implementation
and interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement) in a manner supportive of public health, by promoting both access to existing
medicines and research and development into new medicines and, in this connection, are adopting a
separate declaration.").
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In the Doha process, developing countries and NGOs pointed to commercial
and public sector neglect of the R&D needs of developing countries. Recent studies
claim that the R&D cost of a commercial drug company per new pharmaceutical
product is $802 million.5 The Global Alliance for Tuberculosis Drug Development,
a non-profit entity for R&D of tuberculosis drugs, estimated that the total R&D cost
for a new tuberculosis drug, including the cost of failure, is between $115 million and
$240 million. 6 These high R&D costs claimed by the commercial pharmaceutical
sector pose some key questions that need to be resolved. Is the present system for
funding R&D the most efficient, and is it sufficient to rely on the present intellectual
property systems to fuel innovation? Clearly, in the area of neglected diseases, the
answer is no.
In an increasingly globalized economy, additional international mechanisms need
to be developed to address health needs in developing countries. MSF and others
have proposed a radical shift in the way health R&D is financed in particular for drugs
for neglected diseases. For example, health R&D could be financed based on burden
sharing between countries, or obligating companies to complete essential medical
research. Such a proposal might be incorporated into an international treaty on
essential health R&D. In the end, the challenge for the coming years will be to
encourage essential health R&D not only for the benefit of some, but for the benefit

of all.
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See Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Tufts Centerfor the Study of Drug Development
Pegs Cost of a New PrescriptionMedicine at $802 Million, Press Release (Nov 30, 2001), available online
at <http://www.tufrs.edu/med/csdd/images/NewsReleasell300lpm.pdf> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
See also James Love, How Much Does it Cost to Develop a New Drug, available online at
<http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/econ/howmuch.html> (visited Mar 24, 2002).
For details see The Global Alliance for TB Drug Development, Drug Development Costs, available
online at <http://www.tballiance.org/3_costs.cfinrm=economics&sub=costs> (visited Mar 24,
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